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Case

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

THE FACTS
Defendants (Respondents) do not controvert' r1 AJ~.
tiffs' (Appellants) "Statement of Facts" other than:,
the particulars hereinafter specified. Defendants dr:.
however, deem Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts to be !u.
complete and inadequate.
-I"

The State lease applications filed by Plaintiffs, her1.
inafter ref erred to as the ''subject State applications,"
covered all or portions of 27 different so-called "scboo:
sections'' - i. e. Sections 2, 16, 32, 36 - in 12 different
townships. Such lands are hereinafter ref erred to as tile
''subject lands.'' Prior to the time the State acquireu
title to any of the subject lands, 37 United States oil ana
gas leases had been issued to Defendants under the Min.
eral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (iu
U. S. C. 181 ff.). Such leases are hereinafter ref erred fo
as the "subject Federal leases." As appears from the
Findings of Fact and as will hereinbelow appear, there
is no common denominator of facts in reference to all ol
the subject lands or in reference to all of the subjec!
Federal leases. The several plats of survey coveringthe
subject lands were approved at various dates. The datei
of issuance of the several subject Federal leases vary
(R. 69-86). Other particular facts and circumstance~
differ as to particular lands and as to particular subjer!
Federal leases.

• th e Find·
The pertinent facts are fully set fort h m
.
. court (R. 27-35). I n order tha!
mgs
of Fact of the trial
2

su<'h ]1,indiugs may be conveniently available for refer-

the complete ]1,indings of Fact of the trial court
are set forth in the Appendix hereof with inserted and
italicized references to the Record supporting the several
partieular findings.
,,~nce,

Plaintiffs offer no objection to or criticism of these
Findings other than in respect to Finding No. XIII, their
only comment being (Appl. Br. 13):
'' In conclusion we respectfully submit that the
District Court erred in making its Finding of Fact
No. 13, which stated in substance that the State
Land Board of Utah has not refused to exercise
jurisdiction as to those of the subject lands, title
to which has been acquired by the State."
Plaintiffs do not undertake to dispute in any respect that
the State Land Board did those particular things and
took those particular actions which are referred to in
Finding XIII. Plaintiffs do contend that what was done
by the State Land Board represented a refusal on its part
to "exercise jurisdiction" as to the subject lands.
In their Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs assert (Appl.
Br. 3) that:
"
The lessees of the United States Government
leases requested the five year extension of such
leases from the United States Government and
not thP State of Utah after title to the lands had
passed to the State of Utah (R. 49)."
As appears from the trial court's Finding X (infra p. a-8)
and from the record, (R. 85, 77, 86, 92) the just quoted
3

statement is correct as to but four (SL-070497, U-0500~-"
U-05660 and U-05661) of the 37 subject Federal leasrsi·,
vol ved in this matter. However, even in each of these fo·~'
instances, the Request for Extension was filed with!!,
Bureau of Land Management long before there had beH
any decision by the Bureau of Land Management de!trmining that State title had attached to a portion of Iii,
leased lands and long prior to any notice in this respet1
to the lessee.
THE NATURE OF THE ACTION
Plaintiffs purport to a.sk that the State Land Hoaru
be required to take over the management and control c:
the lands described in their Complaint and the leasin1
thereof (R. 6).
What Plaintiffs really seek to have decided and dt·
clared is that the Utah State Land Board must manag~
and control the subject lands in a particular manner that is, by refusing to recognize the oil and gas leaw
which Def end ants hold and by issuing oil and gas lease~
to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs (Appl. Br. 4) assert that this "action rloe~
not try title nor the rights of any of the parties interesteJ
in the respective leases.''
In sharp contrast with that assertion is Plaintiffs
Point II which reads (Appl. Br. 7):
1
''
The State became the owner of t he Properth
when the surveys were made and accepted byte
Government.''
4

i ,iki·
.,
1

contradiction is found in Plaintiffs' Complaint

!wi cin tlic) allege ilia t the lands therein described "be-

came and now are the property of the State of Utah"
(R. [)) and further allege that the State Land Board "er-

roueously arnl unlawfully deemed said lands to be covered
)Jy

purported extensions of said United States Oil and

Gas Leases, which extensions were purportedly issued
and granted ... at a time, or times, when said lands ...
were owned and possessed in fee simple by the said State
pf Utah.•; (R. 5-6)
It is indisputable that Plaintiffs are asking that the
State Land Board shall be ordered to act upon the premises that the State acquired title to the subject lands, that
it arquirecl such title at a particular time (namely when
the subject lands were surveyed), that such acquisition
uf title by the State defeated the right of the defendantlesseefl to 5-year extensions of their several leases and
that the recognition of such extensions by the Bureau of
Land MaHagement and the State Land Board was erroneous and unlawful.

'l'o do what Plaintiffs ask it to do, this Court must:
l. Determine that a writ of mandate may be used

to compel the Utah State Land Board to reverse
the rulings (R. 56-58) by which it acted upon
an<l rejected Plaintiffs' oil and gas lease applications (R. fl4-55) and to control the manner in
which that Board shall exercise its discretion;
and
5

2. Determine whether and when title to the r
spective sections of land referred to !u tu'
Complaint passed from the United States 1,
the State of Utah; and
3. Determine that the Act of April 22, 1954 (~!
Stat. 57) (commonly ref erred to as the ''Fir~:
Dawson Act''), amended by the Act of July!!.
1956 (43 U. S. C. 870) (commonly referredjr,
as the "Second Dawson Act"), was intended\r1
amend and operated to amend the provisiom
of Section 17 (30 U. S. C. 226) of the Minera!
Leasing Act relating to a 5-year extension 01
the lease term ; and
4. Hold that such determinations may be made ii
an action to which the United States is noh
party.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
A.

AS TO ANY SUBJECT LANDS, TITLE TO WHICH
HAS VESTED IN THE STATE, THE STATI
ACQUIRED TITLE SUBJECT TO THE THEN OU'f.
STANDING LEASE OR LEASES ENTERED INTO
BY THE UNITED STATES AND SUCCEEDED "TD
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES Al
LESSOR UNDER SUCH LEASE OR LEASES" AND
NOT TO ANY OTHER OR DIFFERENT POSITION

B.

THE UNITED STATES IS AN INDISPENSABil
PARTY TO THIS ACTION.
(1) Plaintiffs would have this Court requi;'
the State Land Board to act upo n.tw·.

premise that title to certain school sectiori.·
6

passed from the United States to the State
of fltah at times different than the time
when the Bureau of Land Management of
the Department of the Interior held that
title did pass.
(2) Plaintiffs would have this Court require

the State Land Board to act upon the
premise that title to certain school sections
passed from the United States to the State
of Utah at specified times although there
ha.c; been no determination by the Bureau
of Land Management as to whether or
when State title attached.

( 3) Plaintiffs would have this Court require

the State Land Board to act upon the
premise that certain lands are the property
of the State although the records of the Bureau of Land Management show that title
thereto could not have passed to the State.

( 4) The United States had a continuing inter-

est under a Federal lease entered into by it
as to all lands covered by the lease notwithstanding the fact that title to a portion of the leased lands paBsed to the State
subject to such lease.

C. THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDENT-LESSEE TO A
5-YEAR EXTENSION OF HIS SUBJECT FEDERAL
LEASE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL
5-YEAR TERM THE STATE ACQUIRED TITLE TO
A PORTION OR ALL OF THE LANDS COVERED
THEREBY.
D.

AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT MAY NOT BE USED
TO COMPEL THE UTAH STATE LAND BOARD TO
REVERSE DECISIONS MADE IN THE EXERCISE
OF ITS DISCRETION.
7

ARGUMENT
A.

AS TO ANY SUBJECT LANDS, TITLE TO WHICH
HAS VESTED IN THE STATE, THE STATI
ACQUIRED TITLE SUBJECT TO THE THEN OUT.
STANDING LEASE OR LEASES ENTERED INTO
BY THE UNITED STATES AND SUCCEEDED "TO
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES M
LESSOR UNDER SUCH LEASE OR LEASES" AND
NOT TO ANY OTHER OR DIFFERENT POSITION.

As their Point II Plaintiffs make the broad ana
inaccurate assertion that ''The State became the ow11e1
of the property when surveys were made and accepted b1
the Government.'' (Appl. Br. 7) Any particular landf
which are the subject of this action fall into one of these
three classes :
(1) Those lands as to which the record shows that
the State never acquired title;
(2) Those lands as to which there has been no de·
termination as to whether or when State title
vested; or
(3) Those lands as to which the Bureau of Lana
Management has determined that title veste:l

in the State.
In no instance did the Bureau of Land Management
81
determine that State title vested when the survey "
made and approved.
. Pomt
. I I w1"th th e statement.
Plaintiffs conclude their
1 became
that "By the (Dawson) Act, the State no t on Y

8

tfie lessor i11 place of the Government, but also became
owner of said tyroperty." (Appl. Br. 9) Defendants have
no quarrel with said concluding statement in so far as it
rdates to the lands which fall within Class 3 as above
defined. Defendants do take sharp issue with Plaintiffs'
contention (Appl. Br. 10-11) that the vesting of State title
operated to defeat the statutory right of a defendantlt's.see to a 5-year extension of his lease.
ln tLcir Point II discussion, Plaintiffs state (Appl.
Br. 8):

"
Under the stipulation of facts, there is no
question hut that four of the parcels of land set
forth in plaintiffs' complaint title passed to the
State under the Act of July 11, 1956, before any
application was made for an extension of these
leases and after the primary five year term had expired. These leases are U-07312 (R. 82), U-05660
and U·05661 (R. 86), U-06730 (R. 86A)."
This statement is incorrect and contrary to the record.
As to U-07312, the lease was dated September 1, 1952,
and the Request for Extension was filed June 4, 1957 86 days prior to the end of the initial 5-year term on

August 31, 1957 (R. 82, 158). As to U-06730 (R. 86A),
the lease was dated May 1, 1952, and the Request for Exteirnion ·was filed April 22, 1957 -

9 days prior to the end

of the initial 5-year term on April 30, 1957 (R. 86A, 156).
There has not been in either of these instances any decision holding that State title has attached to any land
eovered thereby (R. 92).
9

...

As to U-05660 and U-05661, the respective lea .
S%11er1
dated December 1, 1951, and the respective Requ es ts .o·
1
Extension were filed November 13, 1956 - 17 day s prior··
to the end of the initial 5-year term on November 30, rn 0~
(R. 86, 151). As to U-05660, it was not until May 27 I 19·0UQ
1
and as to U -05661, it was not until November 6, 1957, thai
the Bureau of Land Management issued a decision ho!Q.
ing that State title attached to part of the lands coverea
(R. 92).

Background of the Dawson Acts.
Under the Enabling Act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat.
107), Congress granted to the State of Utah in aid ol
common schools, sections numbered 2, 16, 32 and 36 i11
each township of the public domain. In the case of Ur1iteri
States v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563; 38 S. Ct. 193; 62 L. Eo.
473, the United States Supreme Court held that the Jana
grant did not extend to lands which were known to be
mineral in character at the date title otherwise woulu
have vested in the State of Utah; that title vested in th1
State as of January 4, 1896, as to then surveyed landi
which were not then known to be mineral in character,
and on the date of acceptance of survey as to lands no!
known to be mineral in character if the lands were un·
surveyed at the time Utah was admitted into the Union:
and also that title would not vest in the State as to Jana
embraced in any Indian, military or other withdrawal or
reservation or if rights of third parties had attached to
the land prior to acceptance of the survey.
10

By the Act of .January 25, 1927 ( 44 Stat. 1026 as
amended, 43 U. R. C. '~870), Congress extended the land
grants in aid of common schools to :
''embrace numbered school sections mineral in
character, unless land has been granted to and/or
selected by and certified or approved, to any such
State as indemnity for or in lieu of any land so
granted by numbered sections.''
'fhe 1927 Act specifically declared that :
''any lands within the limits of existing reservations of or by the United States, or specifically reserved for water power purposes, ... or included
in any valid application, claim or right initiated
or held under any of the existing laws of the United States, unless or until such application, claim
or right is relinquished or cancelled, ... are excluded from the provisions of this act." (Emphasis added.)
This 1927 statute was adopted nearly 7 years after
the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of February
25, 1920 (41Stat.437; 30 U.S. C. 181 :ff.). If lands which
would otherwise become ''school sections'' upon the
acceptance of the survey plats (2, 16, 32 or 36) were covered by an outstanding oil and gas lease or other Federal
mineral lease or prospecting permit or a pending application therefor, at the time of acceptance of the survey
plat, title could not vest in the State until the expiration
or termination of such lease or permit. If lands so leased
proved to be productive, the oil and gas or other minerals
might he extracted from the lands before title passed to
the State. The effeets of this situation were multiplied by
11

delay in government surveys, in consequence of wbiti;
delay millions of acres in Utah remained unsurveyed. A
program was ultimately worked out between the Sta!f
officials and the officials of the United States Department
of the Interior for survey of township boundaries and ot
school sections (2, 16, 32 and 36) to accelerate the vesting
of title to school sections in the State. Even before th!~
program of ''skeleton surveys'' was conceived, ma 11y
thousands of acres of land had been covered by oil and
gas leases. Consequently, the State of Utah particularly
was faced with the prospect of acquiring title to mineral
school sections at some time in the future after the oil
or other mineral resources may have been substantially
depleted.
The ''Dawson Acts'' were directed to this situation.

First and Second Dawson Acts.
The provisions of the First and Second Dawson Acts
are set out and may be compared in the quotation which
follows. In this quotation, words which were included in
the First Dawson Act of April 22, 1954, but which were
omitted in the Second Dawson Act of July 11, 1956, are
bracketed. Words which appeared in the Second Dawson
Act but not in the First Dawson Act are underscored.
"(d) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (c), th~
fact that there is outstanding on any num.bere~
[mineral] school section, whether or not IDl~
.in character, at th e time
.
mineral
of i"ts surve y a .
b
h
U
.
ted
States,
lease or leases entered mto y t e m
th
or an application therefor, shall not preven\10~
grant of such numbered [mineral] school sec
12

to i lit'

Sta tr concerned as provided [in] by this

Ad.

"(2) Any such numbered [mineral], school section

which has heen surveyed prior to the date of [the
enactment of this subsection] approval of this
amendment, and which has not been granted to
the· State concerned solely by reason of the fact
that there was outstanding on it at the time of the
snrVPy a mineral lease or leases entered into by
the United States, or an application therefor, is
hereby granted by the United States to such State
under this section as if it had not been so leased;
and the State shall succeed [to] the position of
the United States as lessor under such lease or
leases.
"(3) Any such numbered [mineral] school section which is surveyed on or after the date of [the
enactment of this subsection] approval of this
amendment and on which there is outstanding at
the time of such survey a mineral lease or leases
entered iuto by the United States, shall (unless
excluded from the provisions of this section by
subsection ( c) for a reason other than the existence of an outstanding lease) be granted to the
State conrerned immediately upon completion of
such survey; and the State shall succeed to the position of the United States as lessor under such
lease or leases.

----

--

'' ( 4) The Secretary of the Interior shall, upon

application hy a State, issue patents to the State
fo.r the lands granted by this Act, in accordance
with the Act of June 12, 1934 ( 48 Stat. 1185, 43
U.S.C. 87la). Such patent shall, if the lease is then
out standing, include a statement that the State
13

succeeded to the position of the United St t .,
I essor a t th e t•ime t h e t•itle vested in the State.
a €Ra'·
'' ( 5) Where at the time rents, royalties, ana
bonuses accrue [,] the lands or deposits coveredn,
a single lease are owned in part by the State an··
in part by the United States, the rents royalti/
and bo~uses shall be allocated betwe~n them ~
proportion to the acreage in said lease owned 01
each.
·
'' ( 6) As used in this subsection, 'lease' includei
'permit' and 'lessor' includes 'grantor'."
The First Dawson Act was, by its terms, limited in
application to numbered ''mineral'' school sections. Witn
the possible exception of Sections 2 and 32 of T. 40 S.,
R. 19 E., there is no evidence that any of the subjer!
lands were known on July 11, 1956, or at any time prior
to or subsequent to that time, to be mineral in character
or known to be valuable for mineral (Finding VI, infra
p. a-5).
In the House Report (1956 U.S. Code, Congressional
and Administrative News, Vol. 2, page 3111, 3112) ou
the bill which became the Second Dawson Act, it is stated:
''
It is the opinion of the Solicitor of the Depa:·(.
ment of the Interior that the term 'numbered mm·
eral section,' as used in the 1954 act, does not perd
mit title to numbered school sections to be passe
to the State where such lands are included inn~~
competitive mineral leases or prospecting perilllbs1
· d to
unless they are subsequently determme
mineral in character either as the result of pro·
geo·
duction therefrom or from land on the same
· me
· 1us1on
· I·n the known
logical structure or of t h eir

14

geological structure of a producing field as defined hy the Geological Survey. Thus, due to the
technical defect referred to in the 1954 act, a State
may obtain title to school section lands known to
be ~aluable for minerals and included in mineral
leases but may not obtain title to school-section
lands included in mineral leases and not known to
be valuable for minerals.''
Plaintiffs (Appl. Br. 8) state:
''
There seems to be no question but that Congress intenrled by this act (First Dawson Act) to
include both mineral and non-mineral land.''
In sharp contrast the House Committee in the Report
referred to above, stated:
''
In short, while it may be argued from the committee and departmental report accompanying
the bill which became the act of April 22, 1954,
that the Congress intended that the broader grant
(i. e., SC'hool sections known to be mineral in character and subject to a mineral lease) carry with it
the lesser grant (i. e., school sections not known
to be mineral in character but subject to a mineral
lease or prospecting permit), the committee agrees
that a plain reading of the existing law negates
that intent."
In an opinion of February 7, 1957 (M-36408), addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management by the Acting Associate Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, it is stated:

·'

The grant made by the act of April 22, 1954
( G8 Stat. 57) does not apply to any school section,
the plat of survey of which was accepted on or after
July 11, 1956. rrhe act of 1954 applies only to a
15

school section, surveyed before or after thf ~'~
which was known on the date of the accepta1tcf: nl
the plat of survey thereof if prior to the ad 1,1
July 11, 1956, supra, or on April 22, 1954, which.
ever is the later date to be of mineral character
and then only where a mineral lease solely pre.
vented from attaching to the section, the grant ol
mineral school sections made to a State by the ac1
of January 25, 1927 ( 43 U.S.C. 870). The act of
1954 applies only to such mineral school sections,
because the act of January 25, 1927, supra, which
it amends, applies only to mineral school sections
excepting non-mineral school sections coming
within the scope of the other amendatory act of
July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 529). As a non-competitive,
non-producing oil and gas lease covering a schoul
section not on the geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field, standing alone, is not sufficient
to warrant a mineral classification of the section,
the act of April 22, 1954, supra, does not apply to
such a section unless the mineral indicationR m
such as to justify classifying the section as mill·
eral in character. Neither is any other kind of non·
competitive, non-producing and non-preference
right mineral lease, standing alone, sufficient to
justify such a classification of a school section. The
failure to include in the grant made by the act.oi
1954 non-mineral school sections covered by mm·
eral leases and to include mineral permits led to
the passage of the act of July 11, 1956 (70 Stat.
529)."
It will be observed that both the First Dawson Act

and the Second Dawson Act reiterate three times that
where a mineral lease or leases entered into by the United
States was outstanding at the time of attachment of Stalt>
16

,; 1 J;·
''·

-

·'the State

:-;Lites

shall succeed to the position of the United

under such lease or leases.''

Plnintiffs contend that the State did not succeed to
the pot>ition of the United States as lessor, but, rather,
succeeded to some other and different position.
As lessor, the United States was obligated to recognize the rights of the respective Defendants in this action
tn extensions of their respective leases affected by this

action. As lessor, the United States has fully recognized
thai obligation in approving the extension requests and
in receiving rents and approving assignments. So likewise has the State of Utah, in so far as it has succeeded
to the position of the United States as lessor, given recognition to the rights of extension and to the extensions
in accepting rents (R. 49) and approving assignments
!R. 88-90) and in rejecting Plaintiffs' lease applications
(R. 56-68). This is the crux of Plaintiffs' plaint.
The Dawson Acts do not contain anything evidencing
or even suggesting any intention of amending or altering
any provision of the Mineral Leasing Act. The Dawson
Acts do not purport to alter any terms of any existing
lease or to abrogate any rights of the lessee under any
existing lease.
Srction 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act.

~ection 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act as amended
and In effect prior to September 2, 1960 ( 30 U. S. C. 226)
mduded the following provisions:
17

"
Upon the expiration of the initial five-\'(
term of any noncompetitive lease maintaine;l i'
accordance with applicable statutory requiremen:.
and regulations, the record titleholder theren1
shall be entitled to a single extension of the lea~e.
unless then otherwise provided by law, for suf'n
lands covered by it as are not on the expiratiuu
date of the lease withdrawn from leasing uu<l~r
this section ... No withdrawal shall be effecfat
within the meaning of this section until ninety da1,
after notice thereof shall be sent by regi~ter;11
mail, to each lessee to be affected by such witl1.
drawal. A noncompetitive lease, as to lands no!
within the known geologic structures of a produr·
ing oil or gas field, shall be extended for a perio1!
of five years and so long thereafter as oil or g~~
is produced in paying quantities.''
These provisions were, by the Act of September ~,
1960 (78 Stat. 781) continued in effect as to any oil auJ
gas lease issued prior to that date (30 U. S. C.
226-l(a) ).

The basic premise of Plaintiffs, a premise rejecle1l
by the trial court, is that a holder of a Federal oil anu
gas lease which was issued prior to the acquisition of title
by the State and which was outstanding at the time the
State acquired title was, through the mere State acqID·
sition of title, as to part of the leased lands, deprived as
to such lands of the right to a 5-year extension under anil
in accordance with the provisions of the Mineral Leasing
Act. Such premise is contrary to the position taken b~
the Bureau of Land Management as evidenced hy it;
approval of the extension requests (R. 69-86A) and by
the Bureau of Land Management letter and decisions se:
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forth at pages 179 through 189 of the Record in this
.. se . The Plaintiffs' premise is also contrary to the
(,\U
position taken by the Utah State Land Board (R. 56-68)
and by the Attorney General of the State of Utah
(R. 191-194) ; and is further evidenced by the position
taken by the State Land Board in this action (R. 7-9).

B. THE UNITED STATES IS AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY TO THIS ACTION.
The United States is not a party to this action and

could not be made a party without its consent. Contrary
to Plaintiffs' Point I contention, Defendants assert that
the United States is an indispensable party.

Monolith Portland Cement Compan.y v. Gillbergh,
277 P. 2d 30, 34-36 (California, December 7, 1954)
and cases cited therein.
South Kamas Irrigation Company v. Provo River
Water Users' Association, 10 U. 2d 225, 350 P. 2d
851-853 (1960).
Plaintiffs contend that in respect to the several subject Federal leases there could be no 5-year extension as
Lo the included school section lands after State title
attached thereto. As vital, then, to Plaintiffs' position
as determination of whether State title attached to a particular tract is determination of when title attached.
(1) Plaintiffs would have this Court require

the State Land Board to act upon the
premise that title to certain school sections
passed f rorn the United States to the State
of Utah at times different than the time
when the Bureau of Land Management of
19

the Department of the Interior heir/ th 1
title did pass.
u
As to 16 of the 37 Federal oil and gas leases affected
by this action, the 5-year extensions were both requesh·d
and were effective prior to the time (July 11, 1956) of \hp
vesting of the State title to the school section lands in.
eluded in such leases as such time has been determineJ
by the Bureau of Land Management (Finding X, R. :50
infra (p. a-8).
If Plaintiffs concede (and Defendants find no such

concession) that State title did not attach to the school
sections affected by these 16 leases, then obviously the,1
will have, to this extent, conceded themselves out of court.
If, on the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that the Bureau
of Land Management decisions as to when State title
attached are incorrect and that State title attached at
some other and earlier date, then it is thus apparent that
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to determine, without
the presence of the United States, that State title attached at dates different to the date determined by thr
Bureau of Land Management. Can it be reasonably urged
that the United States would not be a necessary party to
such a determination?
The Federal government was entitled to all rentals
which accrued prior to the date when State title attached and the accounting between the State and Federal governments has, as to the State acquired lands, been
based upon the attaching of State title on July 11, 1956
(Finding IX, R. 32, infra p. a-7). If State title at20

Lwhe<l earlier, the United States would owe to the State
ct Utah and the State Land Board would have the duty

to demand rentals accruing between the date of such attaeltment and July 11, 1956. Should any determination
from which this result would follow be made in an action
to whirh the United States is not a party?
(2)

Plaintiffs would have this Court require
the State Land Board to act upon the
premise that title to certain school sections
passed from the United States to the State
of Utah at specified times although there
has berm no determination by the Bureau
of Land Management as to whether or
when State title attached.

As to 7 of the 37 subject Federal leases there has
been no decision by the Bureau of Land Management as
to whether or when State title attached to any of the
snbject lands included therein. Should this Court, in
an action to which the United States is not a party, determine whether and when title passed from the United
States to the State~
(3) Plaintiffs would have this Court require

the State Land Board to act upon the
premise that certain lands are the property
of the State although the records of the Bureau of Land Management show that title
thereto could not have passed to the State.

As to 3 of the 37 subject Federal leases the State of
Utah has never acquired title. The school section lands
c·oi;ered by these 3 leases were included in Power Site Resc•ne No. 42 prior to the time when State title would oth-
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erwise have attached. This Power Site Reserve ha~· rn·i•
been revoked (Finding VII, R. 31, infra, p. a-r>J. ·\, '·
another of the 37 subject Federal leases, mo acrP8 ot ti
640 acres involved were included in Power Site Clas~;
fl.cation No. 219 and was thus withdrawn before State titiwould otherwise have attached (Finding VIII, R. 31·3~.
infra, p. a-6). In one of the sections of subject laud (See
tion 2, Township 40 South, Range 19 East), 61.48 acre~
are within Cigarette Springs Cave National l\ionumeut
which was established before the section was suneyed.
This 61.48-acre tract was even excluded from the snbjec!
Federal lease SL-070497 which was issued as to this
section. (Finding III, infra, p. a-2, R. 93.)
If Plaintiffs concede that the State Land Board
should not be required to "exercise jurisdiction" as to
these withdrawn lands, they have not said so.
( 4) The United States had a continuing inter
est under a Federal lease entered into b.ii ii
as to all lands covered by the lease not
withstanding the fact that title to a por

tion of the leased lands passed to the Stair
subject to such lease.

As to 37 of the subject Federal leases all but ?,
(U-04257, U-05000-A and U-013636) embraced lands in
addition to so-called ''school section lands'' (R. 69-Bi,
Finding VIII, R. 32, infra, p. a-6). As to such additional
Federal lands, Plaintiffs must concede that there is no
possible basis for assertion of State acquisition. This sit·
uation prevailed on and prior to July 11, 1956 and ou
the dates when the Defendants assert their 5-year ex·
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11 ,,iolls wPre effective and Plaintiffs claim they were
<)

11

1

When the United States issued a Federal oil and

,.~1 ~ Jease covering certain lands, that lease consisted

.~.

f a single lease and that lease continued as a single lease

,1

;ii tli(~ time of the expiration of the original 5-year term

aml at the time of the filing of a request for the 5-year ex-

tension expressly provided for under the above quoted
Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U. S. C. 226).
The lease did not cease to be a single lease merely because
tlie United St ates, the lessor, transferred title to a portion of the leasPd lands to the State of Utah.
A lessor who has granted an oil and gas lease cannot. h~· eonveying a portion of the leased lands to anotlwr, make two leases out of a single lease and thereby
duninish thr lessee's rights or impose increased burdens
upon the lessee.

"
Despite the statements to the contrary in
Ntaudard Oil Co. v. Giller, and Cosden Oil Co. v.
8carhorough, under the ordinary oil and gas lease,
the lessee's duties under the implied covenants, as
well as his liabilities under the drilling and term
rlauses, are indivisible. The Lessee's duties of de,·elopment relate to the whole of the land leased,
and not to separate units. Neither the lessor nor
tlw lessee, merely by dividing his interest, can in
an~· way change these duties into duties to devel?P p~rtirular portions of the demised premises as
mdmrlual units.'' Summers: The Law of Oil and
rras, Vol. 3, Chap. 16, sec. 516, p. 443.
Any other rule would mean that the lessor by di'
rs h.ip of t 1ie leased lands, could impose
upon

'irling owne

the lessee the necessity of having production from ca' .
of the divided portions in order to maintai11 the !i·a,
beyond the stated or so-called primary term of tl 1r Ji·a,.
Any other rule would mean that the lessor, hy di\idi 11 ~
ownership of the leased lands, could impose upon tb
lessee the necessity of offset drilling as between one por.
tion of the lands covered by the lease and another po;.
tion of the lands covered by this same lease. The court,
have, of course, not countenanced any such a disregar:i
of the rights of the lessee and obligations of the lessnr
under their lease contract.
It is clear from a reading of the First Dawson Act
and of the Second Dawson Act that Congress contemplated that a lease would remain a single lease although
the State acquired title to a portion of the leased lamb.

Each of these Acts included the following provision:
'' ( 5)
Where, at the time rents, royalties, and
bonuses accrue, the lands or deposits eoverc<l by
a single lease are owned in part by the State and
in part by the United States, the rents, royaltie.~.
and bonuses shall be allocated between them rn
proportion to the acreage in said lease owned by
each.''
In discussing the effect of the Dawson Acts upou
Federal oil and gas leases which included Federal lanJi
as well as school section lands title to which vested in tln'
State subsequent to the leasing, the Acting Director oi
the Bureau of Land Management, in a letter dated ~[ay
12, 1958, addressed to A. F. Barrett, President of the
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Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association (R. 180-181)
stated, inter alia:
•'
'I1he regulations of 43 CFR, Parts 191 and 192
will govern these oil and gas leases the same as
before, including extensions, renewals, unitization,
ei.r., notwithstanding their 'so-called' segregation
for administrative purposes. That would not
affect any rights in the leased lands held by virtue of assignments or operating agreements ....
''
Consi<lering the state lease as separate from
the Federal lease will not create multiple drilling
provisions. Production on either portion of the
lease will operate to extend the lease in its entirety.
Royalties on such production will be payable to
the United States and to the State on the basis of
the arreage in the lease owned by each, in the same
manner as payment of annual rentals. The division of income from these leases is discussed in
an opinion by the Associate Solicitor dated July
30, 1957 (M-36460),*' a copy of which is enclosed
for your convenience.

''
There is no authority in the law for segregating any outstanding leases into two separate
and distinct leases, one covering the Federal
lands and the other covering the State lands."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Partieular attention is called to the Acting Director's
Decision of July 16, 1959 (R. 182-183) involving Oil and
Gas Lease Serial U-05660, which is one of the Federal oil
and gas leases affected by this action. That Decision includes the following:

--

"
th

'l'he
decision is in accordance with
. Manager's
.
ese rnstructwns and the law; however, it may be

*R. 187-189
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~tated that the .lands are considered sq.;n•gatr,
mto two categories for purposes of admini.stralun
to aid in allocation of rents, royaltie8, and bonu~~,
which accrue during the time the land8 or depositc
owned in part by the State and in part by the lirnted States are covered by a single lease. It is onh
when the lease terminates in any manner in it·~
entirety, or terminates or is assigned as to all of
the State land, or as to all of the Federal land, that
administration of it as a single lease under tlw
provisions of subsection ( d) ( 5) of the act of .Juh
11, 1956, supra, ceases. See Solicitor's Opinwi;,
M-36460 (July 30, 1957). As to the impairment of
contractual rights under the lease, including leasf'
extensions, the Solicitor held in disenssiug the
lessee's right of relinquishment that the act of
April 22, 1954 (68 Stat. 57), as amended by the
act of July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 529) does not in m1>·
way change the lessee's rights. M-36460 (.July 30,
1957). It is incumbent upon the State to adminiRter Federal leases which it is acquiring under thr
Dawson Act, supra, on the basis of the contractual
provisions of each lease and the rules and re1rulations of the Secretary of the Interior, which form
an integral part of the lease contract." (Empha~i
supplied)

In his Decision of September 1, 1959 (R. 184-1861
affecting Oil and Gas Lease U-02510, the Acting Director
of the BLM stated:

'' * * *
The 'so-called' segregation of the lrase is
for administrative purposes only, and the regnl~
tions contained in 43 CFR 191 and 192 will still
govern such leases as to extensions, renewals, unitization, drilling provisions, etc. Assignments_ of
interests will be filed with tlw agency haYing JUl'isdiction over the lands being assigned. Prodnl'·

2G

tioll on either portion of the lease will serve to
extend tlw lease in its entirety.

'•
'l1here is no statutory authority for the segregation of the lPase into two separate distinct leases,
ime covering the land owned by the State, the
other covering the Federal land. The outstanding lease will continue in full force and effect
until terminated in any manner. Once the lease terminates, the State may issue a separate and distinct lease for the land under its jurisdiction, and
in arcordance with its own laws and regulations.
"
In a memorandum opinion, M-36460, dated
.July 30, 1957, the Associate Solicitor of the Department, in a construction of subsection ( d )( 5) of
the Act of April 22, 1954, as amended supra, has
determined that income from land embraced in
such leases must be proportioned to the State and
the United States on the basis of the acreage
owned by each regardless of whether the lease is
producing or non-producing and whether the producing well is located in the State or in the Federal land in the lease.''
'l'he opinion addressed to Donald G. Prince, Land
Examiner of the Utah State Land Board, under date of
December 4, 1957, by the Assistant Attorney General of
the State of Utah (R. 191-194) places the same interpretation as does the Bureau of Land Management upon the
Dawson Acts.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to place upon the Dawson
.\rts an interpretation at variance with the language of
thest:> ~'\ets
.
.
· ' a n d cont rary to t h e mterpretahon
placed
thereon
· · bv. th a t agency of the Federal government
l'.harged with the administration of the public lands of
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the United States, to the like interpretation placed therp.
on by that agency of the State of Utah charged with th<·
administration of its lands, and to the like interpretation
of the trial court. Plaintiffs do not cite either any language in the Dawson Acts or any authority whatsoever
for the interpretation urged by them.
Each of the Dawson Acts provided that when tlw
State acquired title to a school section it would "succeed
to the position of the United States as lessor" under any
previously issued and then outstanding Federal lease
or leases which affected that school section. These Acts
provided that the State would succeed to "the position of
the United States as lessor," not to some other and different position. How could the State be said to succee1l
to the position of the United States as lessor under a lease
if the State of Utah is to occupy any different position
than the United States in respect to the obligation~ of
the lessor or the rights of the lessee under the law, tl1ilease or the regulations?
Each subject Federal lease which covered lands n
part of which became State owned not only remained, a'
do all of the leased lands, a single lease but the State "as
entitled under the lease to share in any production from
the lease whether that production be from the State-0"11ed
portion of the leased lands or from the portion of tlie
leased lands owned by the United States. It is eqnally
clear that the United States was entitled under the lew• 1'
to share in any production from the lease whether tJiar
production be from that portion of the leasecl prcnu~e~
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retained by the TJ nited States or from that portion of
the leased premises which became State-owned.
'i'his Court is asked by Plaintiffs to declare that the
several subject ~,ederal leases were not extended as to
!hat part of the leased lands which passed to the State.
To so hold would be to declare that a single lease was to
c;uffer amputation. rrhe United States would be a necessary party in any action which directly or by indirection
undertakes to determine its rights under a lease issued by
it and under which it is entitled to participate in the production from all of the leased lands, notwithstanding the
fact that title to a portion of the leased lands may have
passed to the State subject to the lease.
The United States is an indispensable party to this
action.
C. THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDENT-LESSEE TO A

5-YEAR EXTENSION OF HIS SUBJECT FEDERAL
LEASE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL
5-YEAR TERM THE STATE ACQUIRED TITLE TO
A PORTION OR ALL OF THE LANDS COVERED
THEREBY.
At:i io any subject lands title to which vested in the

State, the State took title under the Dawson Acts subject
to th
· ISsued
·
' c pnor
Federal lease and succeeded to the
position of the United States as lessor under such lease.
"Tl18
.,.
posrnon of the United States as lessor" relates and
must relate to the rights and obligations of the lessor and
the ('Orres pon d'mg obl'igat10ns
.
.
and rights
of the lessee
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under the lease, the Mineral Leasing Act and the appli
cable Mineral Leasing Act regulations. These rights and
obligations find definition in the lease, the Mineral Lea~.
ing Act and such regulations. Plaintiffs would have thii
Court rewrite and redefine them.
Each subject Federal lease expressly provided that
the lease was issued :
''
pursuant, and subject to the terms and pruvisions of the Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat.
437) as amended ... and to all reasonable regula
tions of the Secretary of the Interior now or hereafter in force when not inconsistent with any expressed and specific provisions herein, which are
made a part hereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
The provisions of Section 17 of said Act relating to 5-year
extensions have been hereinbefore quoted (supra p. 18).
In Murphey v. McKay, 233 F. 2d 697, 698; C. A. D. C.
1956, the court stated :
''
Under the non-competitive lease provisions of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended i1~
1946, 30 U. S. C. A. §226, the record titleholder ol
a five-year oil and gas lease on public lands issue~
thereunder is entitled to a single extension thereol
for a period of five years, provided he files an a~·
plication therefor within 90 days before the expi·
ration of the initial term.''
Plaintiffs state (Appl. Br. 11):
.

1- ot'

''
After title passes to the State, Section ' ·
the Mineral Leasing Act would not rontrul. Tlw
controlling provision would be 30 U. S. C. A.. Ser·
tion 189, ... ''
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Plaintiffs do not and cannot cite any authority whatrY<·r for that unfounded assumption. They merely quote

;m lJ. s. C. A. Section 189 and, following such quotation,
state:
•'
The provision just quoted covers Section 226
authorizing the extension of leases unless otherwise provided by law, and as stated in Section
189 it has been otherwise provided by law in relation to the rights of states."
Section 189 states no such thing and is not, Defendants
submit, susceptible of such distortion. Section 189 was
enacted as Section 32 of the Mineral Leasing Act twentysix years before the provision for 5-year extensions was

first written into Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act
by the Act of August 8, 1946 (60 Stat. 951) and thirty-

four years before the First Dawson Act was enacted. The
first sentence of Section 189 authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to make rules and regulations to accomplish
the purposes of the Mineral Lea.sing Act. The second and
final sentence of Section 189, as enacted, appears as a proviso reading :
"
Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be
construed or held to a:ffect the rights of the States
or other local authority to exercise any rights
which they may have, including the right to levy
a~d collect taxes upon improvements, output of
mmes, or other rights, property or assets of any
lessee of the United States."

In considering the purpose of that proviso, the United States Supreme Court, in Mid-Northern Oil Co. v.
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Walker et al., 268 U. S. 45, 50; 45 S. Ct. 440, 441
stated:

(1'1~~11 .

''
No doubt what Congress immediately had iu
mind was the necessity of making it clear that
notwithstanding the interest of the government ir;
the leased lands, the right of the states to tax
improvements thereon and the output thmof
should not be in doubt; but the intention likewi 8 ~
to save the authority of the states in respect to all
other taxable things is made evident by the addition of the three general categories, 'other rights,
property or assets.' We think the proviso plainly
discloses the intention of Congress that person>
and corporations contracting with the United
States under the act, should not, for that reason,
be exempt from any form of state taxation otherwise lawful.''

If, as Plaintiffs urge, acquisition of State title served to
obliterate the provisions of Section 17 relating to a
5-year extension, it served to obliterate all other pr0Yisions of said Section 17 relating to the rights anct
obligations of the lessee and lessor. If such State
acquisition of title served to obliterate Section li,
it served to obliterate as well all provisions of erery
section of the Mineral Leasing Act re la ting to rights
or obligations under any prior issued Federal permit or lease, whether such permit or lease were issued
for oil and gas or for coal, phosphate, Rodium, potassium
or oil shale. The Dawson Acts enable the State to stPp
into the shoes of the United States as lessor hut they
do not contemplate that such shoes can be used to walk
away from the obligations which the lease, the law and
the regulations imposed upon the United States ati le~s,ir.

32

'rlie significance and importance of this action ex-

not only to the 37 subject Federal leases here in1 oh'e<l hut to other Federal leases in respect to which
the State, after issuance, has acquired or may acquire
title to all or a portion of the leased lands. They relate
not only to oil and gas leases but to leases or permits for
other Leasing Act minerals. They relate not only to the
extension provision in said Section 17 but to the numer.1u8 other sections of the Mineral Leasing Act providing
for extension of leases and permits under specified cir<·umstances and defining other statutory rights accorded
to lessees or permittees under the Mineral Leasing Act.
t clld

D. AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT MAY NOT BE USED
TO COMPEL THE UTAH STATE LAND BOARD TO
REVERSE DECISIONS MADE IN THE EXERCISE
OF ITS DISCRETION.

Plaintiffs contend that the State Land Board should
be disciplined by an extraordinary writ because the
Board has allegedly ''failed and neglected to assume the
management and control of said lands and have refused
to act upon the applications of the respective plaintiffs
as set forth above, except to deny the same." The stipulated facts el early show that the State Land Board acted
npou each of Plaintiffs' oil and gas lease applications
and rejected them (R.. 56-68) - this for the reason that
the State Land Board recognized and held that the lands
applied for were subject to the prior issued and out~tanding leases of Defendants. The State Land Board
further ha s exercise
· d management and control as to all
of the subject lands as to which State title has attached
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by accepting rents (R. 49) and royalties paid unJr-i 11;
oil and gas leases which had been issued by the Bureau 11
Land Management prior to attachment of State title
and has also clearly shown to have exercised manageme 111
by approving assignments (R. 88-90) which have bm
filed as to 21 of the 37 outstanding leases affected by thi,
action.
1

That the State Land Board was not reluctant tu
exercise jurisdiction and manage and control those subject lands which the State acquired is further evidencecl
in its actions particularly referred to in Finding XIII
(infra p. a-10) and in the stipulated facts (R. 195-19i)
Refusal by the State Land Board to disregard the prior
issued Federal lease to which State ownership was subject was not refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs actually seek, by asking for an extraordinary writ, to have this Court review and reverse the actions of the State Land Board on Plaintiffs' several lease
applications. In the case of Hathaway v. McConkie, s:i
Utah 21; 38 P. 2d 300, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
" ... It is well established that a writ of mandate
may be used to compel an inferior tribunal to aet
on a matter within its jurisdiction, but not to c~n
trol its discretion while acting nor to reverse it~
judgment when made.''

Plaintiffs assume that the State Land Board wa~
required to issue leases to Plaintiffs. Sections 65-1-lS
and 19, U. C. A. 1953, in effect at the time suit was fiiled.
provided that the State Land Board may lease any por34

·ion of the unleasrd lands of the State "for such royalty
l
,h
. ·odurt as the board may deem fair and in the
l!JlOll t C }Jl
.IJl(e!'PS
'
. t S of 'he
s~tate
'' The State Land Board found that
L
' "
the lands covered by Plaintiffs' applications were not unieased lauds as far as the oil and gas was concerned.
Mandamus will not issue to compel performance of
a discretionary act. Street v. Fourth Judicial District
1'ourt, 113 Utah 60; 191 P. 2d 153.
CONCLUSION
The length of this Brief stands m recognized contrast to the brevity of the Brief of Appellants. In that
brevity is to be found disregard of the differing facts
and circumstances which relate to the 27 particular sections of land here involved and 37 particular subject
Federal leases. Unsupported assertions require less
space than reasoned and authority-supported refutations.
The length of this Brief is dictated by Defendants' concept of their duty of adequate presentation.
When, as to any subject lands acquired under the
Dawson Acts, the State succeeded to "the position of
the United States as lessor" under any prior issued subject Federal lease, it did just what those Acts said,
namely, succeeded to the position of the United States as
les8or a- d t t
u no o any other or different position whatsot1ver Tl
·
· le respective extensions of the subject Federal
leases w
I'd
. · · ere va i and effective. When the State Land
Board reJ'ected Pl am
. t'ff
'
b'
. .
.
1 s su Ject State applications, it
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did the only thing it could do properly. It could not

~rup

erly issue oil and gas leases on lands already subject to,,;
and gas leases. As to those subject lands which the Statt
acquired, the State Land Board's rejection of

P!n 1 ~1 -

ti:ffs' applications was not only an exercise of managi·ment and control, it was a proper exercise of manageme 111
and control.
Defendants (Respondents) respectfully submit tlrn1
the Findings of Fact of the trial court are fully supported
by the Record; that the Conclusions of the trial court 1m·
correct and fully supported by the facts as found and
by applicable law; that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed ; and that Respondents should ht
awarded their costs incident to this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
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& McCAHTHY
Attorneys for Def endoot
El Paso Natural Gas Products
Company
SENIOR & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendwnts
Harry Edison, Randolph A. Hearst,
Edward L. Heuck, W. G. Lasrich,
Ben K. Lerer, Alta Lindquist, Albert C. Massa, Louis B. Mayer,
H. C. McAuley, Arwin E. Ormsby,
Petro-Atlas Corporation, RooseveltLee-Magee, Ltd., Shell Oil Company, Benjamin H. Swig, Leslie B.
Tomley, Upheaval Dome Oil Corporation, Virginia C. Wolden, C. S.
Watts.
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APPENDIX
FINDINGS OF FACT
I

•'
The respective Plaintiffs heretofore and in November and December, 1956, filed in the State Land Office of
the State of Utah 21 • certain applications for mineral (oil
and gas) leases (R. 46). Hereinafter in these Findings and
Conclusions said applications are referred to as the 'subject State Applications' and the State of Utah is referred
to as the 'State.' Exhibit "1" (R. 54-55) attached to the
Stipulation of Facts filed herein sets forth, as to each
subject State Application, the name of the applicant
(plaintiff) by whom filed, the mineral lease application
C\fLA) number assigned to said application by the State
Laud Officei the date of filing of said Application in the
f;rate

I .and Office and the description of the lands covered

by said application. The lands covered by said 21 subject

State applications are hereinafter in these Findings of
Fad and Conclusions of Law collectively referred to as

the 'subject lands.' The subject lands involve all or portions of 27 different so-called 'school sections,' (i. e. Sections 2, 16~ 32 and 36) in 12 townships.
*

MLA
6989
6990

6991
7001
7002
7003

7004
7005
7006
7007
7033

15010
15037
15044
15045
15046

a-1

15047
15056
15062
15063
15066

II

''

Each of Plaintiffs is now and at

th(~

time nl

ti.
'Jj\

filing of the subject State Applications filed by mL
Plaintiff and at all intervening times was a <'itizeH of 1Ji

1

United States, qualified to file applications for oil and ga,
leases from and to take oil and gas leases from the Stale.
Each subject State Application was filed on the form

ill!';

in the manner prescribed by the State Land Boaro oi
Utah for the filing of applications for oil and gas

leas~.'

from the State (R. 47).

III
"

Prior to the time that the State aequired titl1•

tr:

any of the subject lands, 37 United States Oil and G:;'
leases• (R. 48, 6.9-87) had been issued by the Bmean ol
Land Management of the Department of the Interior
(hereinafter referred to as "BL1\'1' ') under the i\linernl
Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amernled 1::i:
U. S. C. 181 ff) hereinafter referred to as thl' '~li1wn1l
Leasing Act,' covering (among other lands) all of thl'
subject lands, except that portion ( 61.48 acres) in S1: 1••
* Serial
SL-070497
SL-071028
U-02661
U-04106
U-04107
U-04108
U-04257
U-04258
U-04259
U-04302

U-04304
U-04305
U-04320
U-04398
U-04399
U-04408
U-04409
U-04417
U-04532

U-04533
U-04637
U-04679
U-04684
U-04685
U-04686
U-04687
U-04688-A
U-04922

a-'.2

U-04925
U-05000-A
U-05152
U-05153
U-05660
U-05661
U-06730
lJ-07312
U-013637

tll'll

• '[

..!.,

. 1 ]llJOl
.· . t'i'

~!Iii

R . t '.J K ' which was on February 11, 1916,
tlie surYey thereof included within Cigarette

• -:t1() I..'
u.,

L

.... · ., •'a\'e
,,
· Natio11al Monument as a result of a Presi-

:-:;1a111g~

di·ntial Proclamation of that date, and which remains so

inel Di kd ( U. 48, 8.'i,
}r:i.-

.9.1).

These 37 United States oil and

ll·ase'< are hereinafter ref erred to as the 'subject

F.·deral leases.' F.ixhibit "A" (R. 69-86a) attached to the
'°T1p11!<:d ioTI of Fads filed herein sets forth as to each
, 11 bject

Federal lease (R. 48-49) the name of the lessee,

the dat!:' of the lease, the date of the filing of a request for a

:-;_,ear cxtern,io11, the date of the approval of such request,
thr dcsrription of any Section 2, 16, 32 or 36 lands cov-

tTed thereby, reference to the conflicting subject State

:ipplicati(ln, the date of approval of the Plat of Survey of
t!:1: particular township involved, and the withdrawals,

if any, which had been made affecting the particular subjPl't lands involved. As to each of the 37 subject Federal

leases a request or application for a 5-year extension of

the initial 5-year term of the lease (hereinafter referred
ti;

a::; a '5-year

exte11sion request') has been filed with and

lia" been approved by the BLM (R. 93-161). As to

~ l'-Ofi7::3o and U-07312) of the subject Federal leases,
1

1

i1t· initial fl-year term of the lease expired subsequent to

llie tiliu!! of the subject State applications (R. 86a, 156,
"? . /.)"<),

As to the remainder of the subject Federal

](·uses the · ·f I -

·

nu ia u-year term of the lease expired prior
'
. .
·
ie su l'
i.wct State
apphcat10ns.

tothc>filing 0 f tl

IV
''
The State Land Board of Utah rejected each of tn:
21 subject State applications and by several letters, eac!:
dated January 20, 1958, advised the applicant that thf
application had, on January 6, 1958, in some instances,
and on January 7, 1958, in the remaining instances, at 0
regular meeting of the State Land Board, been rejerted
as to the subject lands which were covered by such appJi.
cation; that the subject lands covered by the applieatioL
were included in oil and gas leases issued by the United
States (R. 56-68); and that the Attorney General of tLr
State, in an opinion dated December 4, 1957 (R. 191-194).
had ruled that the respective 5-year extensions of tim
granted by the United States on those respective lease,
issued by the United States were valid and should be rec
ognized by the State.

v
"
By Executive Order of July 2, 1910, part of th
subject lands, to-wit: Sections 2 and 32 of T. 40 S., K
19 E., S. L. M., were withdrawn and reserved as pan
of Petroleum Reserve No. 7 (R. 47). By Public Land
Order No. 1160 of June 6, 1955, said Executive Order oi
July 2, 1910, which had been made prior to the appro\'al
of the plat of survey of said township on March 28, 19e.
was revoked as to said Sections 2 and 32. Prior to sai:i
Public Land Order of June 6, 1955, subject Federal lease'
SL-070497, U-02661, U-04637 and U -06730, had beei.
issued. Said subject Federal leases SL-070497, U-02 661.
U-04637 and U -06730 embraced (among other lands) sai,;
1
•
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and that portion of said Section 2 which is not
Springs Cave National Monument
11 jthiu Cigarette
<",

[IPll

;~2

1R 47-48).

Prior to the acceptance or approval by the BLM
of the several plats of the United States surveys coveriHg the subject lands other than the above mentioned
St'etions 2 and 32, the remaining 33 subject Federal leases
whirh had been issued embrace (among other lands) all
of such subject lands, other than said Sections 2 and 32
(R. 48).

VI
With the possible exception of Sections 2 and 32 of
1'. 40 S., R. 30 E., • there is no evidence that any of the
subject lands were known on July 11, 1956, or at any
time prior to or subsequent to that time, to be mineral in
character or known to be valuable for mineral.

VII
All of Section 36, T. 27 S., R. 17112 E. (being a portion of the lands covered by subject Federal lease U-05153
- R. 77) and the W. % of Section 32, T. 27 S., R. 18 E.
(being a portion of the lands covered by subject Federal
lea1;e U-04320 - R. 78) and all of Section 2, T. 28 S.,
~· 17% E. (being a portion of the lands covered by sub.wet Federal leases U-05152 - R. 70 and U-05153 R. 77 ) were included within Power Site Reserve No. 42
of July 2 1910
.
.
'
, pr10r to approval of the respective Plats

--

' "R. 30 ~·"should read "R. 19 E."
See Stipulation of Facts par. 4 (R. 47).
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of Survey of said townships and remam so incluut:
(R. 87). The SW 14 of Section 36, T. 39 S., R. 21 K,wa.
included in Power Site Classification No. 219, effPrtiy,
February 26, 1929, prior to the approval of the plat
survey of said section and remains so included (R. 8u:
11

VIII
"
As to one (U-04320) of the 37 subject Feder~;·
leases, the BLM has held that State title has nerer ;·
tached to any of the leased lands covered thereby li;
reason of pre-survey inclusion within Power Site Rt··
serve No. 42 (R. 114). As to 7 (U-02661, U-045:J~.
U-04637, U-05152, U-05153, U-06730, U-07312) of thd;
subject Federal leases, there had been no decision by the
BLM as to whether or when State title attached to any
of the subject lands covered thereby (R. 91-92, 97, 12!1-W.
127-128, 146-148, 149-150, 156-157, 158-160). Each of

these 7 leases covered Federal lands in addition to thP
subject lands covered thereby (R. 85, 72, 78, ; 11 ,
77, 86a, 82).
''
As to the remaining 29 of the 37 subject Fcdera:
leases, the BLM has rendered decisions holding that State
title attached to all or part of the subject lands co\'ereil
by said respective leases on a specified date (R. 91-92))»
to one (SL-070497-R. 85, 91, 94) of these 29 leat:Jes, title
was held to have attached June 6, 1955, (the date of P. L
0. No. 1160) to that portion of the subject lands corerf:!
thereby, this by reason of the Act of April 22, 1954, (tiS
Stat. 57) commonly ref erred to as the 'First Dawson
•lll
Act.' As to another ( U-04688-A R. 80) of these ·'
a-6

1

,·;to:•>. :-ital!• title was held by BLM decision to have

irt;idll'd

,July 11, 1956 (the date of the Act of July 11,

Stai. 529; 43 U.S. C. 870), commonly referred
'C• a~ tlw 'Seeond Dawson Act') as to 480 acres of the
ti-HJ ar·res of imbject lands covered thereby and to have
.\ er att11che<l to the remaining 160 acres by reason of
111
prl'-~urwy inclusion within Power Site Classification No.
:!10 (R. so, 14U). As to the remaining 27 of these 29 leases,
L~,c !11 all of the suLject lands covered thereby was held
10 han_. nttached July 11, 1956, under the Second Dawson
l'.J.)ti, (/0

Ad (R. 91-92).
Of the above referred to 29 leases all but 3

(U-04257, U-05000-A, U-013637) at the times when the re-

5-ycar extension requests were filed, when State
title attaehed to the subject lands covered by the respecti\·e leases, and when the respective BLM decisions were
issued recognizing the extensions, embraced lands in
addition to those whieh became State lands (R. 69-86a).
~pcctive

IX
··
As to ~mbject Federal lease SL-070497, the accounting of rentals as between the United States and the State

upon the vesting of State title to the included
sdwo! sedioll lands on June 6, 1955. As to subject Fedl'ral h'ase tT-04688-A, such accounting was based upon
111 l' \·i:sting of State title to 480 acres of the 640 acres of
uiclndC'd school section lands on July 11 1956 the date
'
'
of thl· Sel'ond Dawson Act (R. 49, 50, 91, 92). As to sub.i"f't F'erlnal lease U-04320, the BLM held that State title
did iwt vest as to any of the leased lands (R. 87, 91, 114).
was ha~:ed
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As to subject Federal leases U-02661, U -04532, l'-04C.
U-05152, U-05153, U-06730 and U-07312, it appears tla
there has been no BLM decision as to whether or wh,,
State title attached to any of the leased lands and cor~,
quently there has been no accounting between the Unit.
States and the State with respect thereto (R. 91-92, y;
123-124, 127-128, 146-148, 149-150, 156-157,

158-161!

As to the remaining 27 subject Federal leases, the a,
counting between the United States and the State ofllta:
as to rentals paid to the United States thereunder La•
been based upon the attaching of State title to the Hrhor
section lands on July 11, 1956 (R. 49-50, 91-92).

x
"
As to one (U-04320) of the subject Federal leasi·,,
the BLM decision of May 6, 1958, held that State tit\,
did not attach to any of the leased lands - this by reasor
of pre-survey inclusion of the school section lands witln:
Power Site Reserve No. 42 (R. 87, 91, 114). As to 2 oth1·
(U-05152 and U-05153 - R. 70, 146-148, 77, 149-15U, F;
of the subject Federal leases, the same preclusion of at
tachment of State title is shown by the evidence to exist

1

''
As to each of 16* of the subject Federal leases, the
5-year extension request had been filed and the requrste,i
extension was effective prior to the time (July 11, 1956) ni
the vesting of State title to a portion of the leasrd Ian,[,
as thereafter determined in the applicahle RLM del'isiiii

* Lease

Record

SL-071028 ________ 74
U-04106 ............ 70
U-04107 ............ 69
U-04108 ............ 76
U-04257 ____________ 71
U-04258 ............ 71

Lease
U-04259
U-04302
U-04304
U-04305
U-04398

Record

............ 76
............ 81
............ 81
........... .82
............ 84
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Lease
U-04399
U-04408
U-04409
U-04417
U-04533

. ···
.. ···
.. ·
-

Reconi
... ~
74
8.3

73

to Ntch of 9• of the subject Federal leases the
-,_yrar extension request had been filed with the Bureau
ul: Lalld l\Ianagement prior to the date when, according
to later decisions of the Bureau of Land Management,
the State acquired title to any of the leased land.
:\~

As to only 4 (SL-070497, U-05000-A, U-05660,
l1-05G61) of the subject Federal leases with respect to
1r!tich a BLM decision holds State title to have attached
tu the included subject lands, the 5-year extension request was filed with the BLM after the date of the vesting
of State title as set forth in such decision (R. 85, 77, 86,
91-!12).

In each instance, where there has been a .BLM de"
('ision holding State title to have vested as to part or all
nf the leased lauds, the 5-year extension requested was
fill'd with and was approved by the BLM prior to the decision so holding and prior to any notification to the
lt:ii::;ee under the subject Federal lease or to the State in
respert to such attaching of State title (R. 69-86a, 93-161).

XI
"
Rach subject Federal oil and gas lease expressly
proYides (R. 16'2-178) that the lease was issued:
'· · . . pursuant, and subject to the terms and proviHions of the Act of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat.
4.:37) as amended .... and to all reasonable regulations of the Secretary of the Interior now or here• Lease

Record

tu1 ·-0404667896 ·.·.·.·.·.··.·.·_·.. 7809
U.04922 ...... :
75

Lease
Record
tr -04684 ............79
U-04687 ............ 83
U-04925 ............ 75
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Lease
Record
U-04685 ............7a
U-04688-A ........80
U-013637 ..........72

after in force wh<>n not inconsistt>nt with ;1 11 , .
pressed and specific provisions hen•iJl, whidi ;i
made a part hereof.'

XII
''
Each of the subject Federal leases was a noneoni.
petitive lease and, at the expiration of the initial :1-Yt'li'
term thereof, had been maintained in accordanrl' 1, !'.
applicable statutory requirements and regnlatii:i>
(R. 49). There is no evidence that any of the suhjP1'
lands or other lands embraced within any subject lea,,
were within the known geologic structure of a prodnm:
oil or gas field at the time of the expiration of thr ini1i::'
5-year term thereof or at any time prior or snhseqm1·
thereto. There is no evidence that any of the suhject la11d,
or other lands embraced within any subject F'e<lernl lea»
have been included within any withdrawal from lca,ln~
at or prior to the expiration of the initial 5-year t 1~rn
thereof. As to each of the subject Federal lease~, th
5-year extension request was filed in the Utah Land Ofli"'
of the BLM by the record title holder of the leasr withi
a period of 90 days prior to the expiration of the ini1ia'
5-year term thereof. As to each subject Federal leasi.
such 5-year extension request was approved by the BU!
as to all of the lands coYered thereby prior to any no1ii·
by the BLM to the lessee or to the State that 8tnt 1' titr,
had attached to any of the leased lands. (R. 69-8Go).
1

XIII
"

The State Land Board of Utah has not rl'fll!•l' 1l '·

exercise jurisdiction as to those of tlH' subjert laud~ tit
a-10

by the State. The stipulated
,J 111 w tli:it the State Land Board, in several in-

, ··Ii Ji·is
IH'l'll
(

:Jt \, 1lll
:; ,,.
1

;H·1 111irPd

as to some of the subject lands, to
,•\•·rcise jurisdiet io11 prematurely. In three instances, it
iPi•krto;.k, l1don· thP e11actme11t of the First Dawson
nill, to grant minl'ral knses on lands which were then
!1' :
t l1P t irn<' of suney sn hject to prior issued and out1 1 11
-t:irH't'"· 11 11dcrtook,

..:1

:iiili n~ F1•deral Jens<>s (H 195, items I (1), II (1) and

, : 1 :.

111

'.2:2 iJl:-;lnw·<>s, it undertook to grant leases (R.

I (1) anrl (2), II (1) through (6), Ill
tl) tl1ru11,qh (.1) (5) (fi) and (8) through (16)) prior to
th(· tinw (.Jnly 11, 1956) when the Bureau of Land Man/'1i, 1/f'111 ..;

:lg'l'lll01lt

held titl<> to have attached to the affected State

lands ( R. 1.1J1 192). Subsequent to the vesting of title

in :he Statv, the State Land Board has exercised jurisdietio11 in collecti11g rents and in approving assignments
011 ~11rh of thrse prematurely issued leases as were not
"arlier canccll<>u. In 2 instances, the State Land Board
l:ai' issued metalliferous minerals leases since State title
\'l'.-;t0d ( n. 196, 197a, items Ill ( 4) and (7) ). The State
Laud Board ha:;; exercised jurisdiction in rejecting Plaintiff'R appli('ations, in receiving and accepting rentals as
io thr Rtate lands covered by subject Federal oil and gas

lrase:; and in approving assignments as to 21 of the sub.il'<'t Pcderal oil nnd gas leases in so far as such assignIlll·nt" •·nn:red lands, title to which had been acquired by
tliP Statr nnder thP First Dawson Bill or Second Dawson
Bill (R. HB-.'10)."
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